ABSTRACT: Psychological studies predominately find a positive relationship between violent video game play and aggression. However, these studies cannot account for either aggressive effects of alternative activities video game playing substitutes for or the possible selection of relatively violent people into playing violent video games. That is, they lack external validity. We investigate the relationship between the prevalence of violent video games and violent crimes. Our results are consistent with two opposing effects. First, they support the behavioral effects as in the psychological studies. Second, they suggest a larger voluntary incapacitation effect in which playing either violent or non-violent games decrease crimes. Overall, violent video games lead to decreases in violent crime.
Introduction
From the sensational crime stories of the 19 th century (Comstock and Buckly 1883) 1 In 2010, California passed a law making it a punishable offense for a distributor to sell a banned violent video to a minor. The US Supreme Court struck down this law in June, 2011. 2 In the opening paragraph of his literature review, Anderson (2004) suggested violent video games were responsible for the recent wave of school shootings since the late 1990s.
If violent video games can be shown to cause violence, then laws aimed at reducing access may benefit society at large. Yet to date, though there is ample evidence that violent video games cause aggression in a laboratory setting, laboratory stings cannot address issues of selection or incapacitation. Ward (2010) shows that adolescents who are otherwise predisposed to violence tend to select into video game play. Dahl and Dellavegna (2009) suggest that violent movies incapacitate violent crime offenders. Likewise, since the hours it takes to "beat the game" substitute for some other activity, a complete analysis of video game effects must consider the opportunity cost of this time. Violence may fall because violent people are attracted to violent games and because gamers engaged in virtual violence are not simultaneously engaged in actual violence.
To date, there is no evidence that violent video games cause violence or crime. In fact, two recently published studies analyzed the effect of violent media (movies and video game stores) on crime, and found increased exposure may have caused crime rates to decrease (Dahl and Dellavegna 2009; Ward 2011 ). These studies, unlike the laboratory studies, were conducted with observational data, which poses unique scientific challenge to establishing causality. However, since laboratory studies have never shown that video game violence causes crime or violence, despite researchers out-of-sample predictions (Anderson 2004) , observational studies may be the only ethical and practical way to test for such a causal effect.
To many in this field, it is logical to assume that if exposure to violent media causes aggression in the lab, it will therefore cause aggression when exposure occurs non-randomly outside the laboratory. Psychologists have adapted the general aggression model, or GAM, to the video game setting Anderson and .
GAM hypothesizes that violent media, including violent video games, increases a person's aggressive tendencies through a process of social learning that occurs simultaneous to the exposure itself. Violent media causes the person to mistakenly develop certain scripts, or rules of thumb, that are used to interpret social situations both before they occur, as well as afterwards. GAM posits, in other words, that violent video games cause aggression by biasing individuals towards forming incorrect beliefs about relative danger that they are in. Perception biases towards hostility, therefore, can in turn cause the person to respond in either a "fight or flight" fashion. It may also permanently alter a person's point of view, creating an aggressive personality as an outcome . A variant of the "rational addiction" model (Becker and Murphy 1988) may be a fair representation of GAM. The key insight for GAM is that consumption of a good in one period not only affects current utility directly but, through a capital stock accumulation mechanism, it also affects future utility indirectly.
The opportunity cost of playing a video game is not just pecuniary but also includes lost time. In fact, for many gamers, the value of the time spent playing a game may be worth much more than the pecuniary cost of the game. This time spent gaming cannot be spent on other activities, legitimate or otherwise, if time use is rival in consumption. The substitution patterns from video games may derive more from time use effects than from pecuniary costs (Becker, 1965) . Evidence for video games having a time use component can be found in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) . The authors identified a causal effect of studying on academic performance by utilizing the random assignment of college students to roommates with a video game console, relative to the counterfactual, which caused students to study less often, and in turn, to perform worse in school
In this paper, we argue that since laboratory experiments have not examined the time use effects of video games, which incapacitate violent activity by drawing individual gamers into extended gameplay, laboratory studies may be poor predictors of the net effects of violent video games in society. Consequently, they overstate the importance of video game induced aggression as a social cost. We argue that since both aggression and time use are a consequence of playing violent video games, then the policy relevance of violent video game regulation depends critically on the degree to which the one outweighs the other. If, as we find in our study, the time use effect of violent video games reduces crime by more than the aggression effects increase it, then the case for regulatory intervention becomes weaker.
While some early work has been done on the long-term effects of video game play, nearly all the laboratory evidence that currently exists has only uncovered very short-term effects, which is when time use effects could be the most important.
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As with Dahl and Dellavegna (2009) Dellavegna (2009) and Ward (2011) .
One advantage of our approach is that we can attempt to disentangle the separate effects of both a behavioral change toward more aggression and incapacitation due to time use. Our results provide some support for the psychological finding that, absent incapacitation, violent video games lead to more aggression as measured by violent crimes.
However, our results also suggest that this is dominated by possible incapacitation and selection effects leading to a net reduction in violent crimes. This approach can help guide 3 In Anderson (2004) , the author notes the glaring omission of longitudinal studies of effects of violent video games on aggression in his conclusions on the state of the research, calling for more studies aimed at investigating the long-term effects. If nothing else, though, this makes our point that the abundance of evidence that we know does exist only speaks to short-term effects of violent video games on aggression, which is the purpose of this study here.
investigators to develop more holistic research designs, such as field experimentation and other quasi-experimental methodologies, to determine whether the net social costs of violent games are non-trivial. The main shortcoming of our approach is due to the limitations of our data on game sales. Unfortunately, the industry does not report cross-sectional variation in game sales -only the national weekly sales of the top 50 highest grossing games are available. As a result, our paper follows a methodology similar to Dahl and Dellavegna (2009) , who estimated the impact of violent movies, proxied by daily ticket sales, on crime using only time series methods.
The paper is structured as follows: the second section our data and methodology. The third presents and discusses our results. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications for public policy.
III. Data and Methodology
Randomized assignment of a treatment with comparison groups used to make comparative counterfactuals is widely considered the "gold standard" in the social sciences (Fisher 1935; Campbell and Stanley 1963; ). Yet, it is widely known that experimentalism may fail to identify true causal effects for a variety of reasons (Berk 2005; Deaton, 2010; Heckman and Urzua, 2010; Imbens 2010 we explain our research design and the data used to overcome some of the limitations of a purely experimental methodology.
A. Empirical Methodology
The models of video game violence suggest that the effect of violent video game play on crime will depend on whether a sizable stock of aggressive tendencies accumulates and on the games' time use intensities.
Since the theoretical predictions are ambiguous and the policy relevance of the laboratory studies is unclear, empirical work outside of a laboratory context is warranted. exploits the variation in game sales correlated only with the variation in quality, and thus is mostly free of variation due to factors related to crime. Zhu and Zhang (2010) show that consumer reviews of video games are positively related to game sales. Ratings are valuable pieces of information for video games because games are complex experience goods for which gamers cannot know their preferences without playing. Our data on professional ratings contain rich information that communicates the kinds of information that gamers value in forecasting their beliefs about the game, and as beliefs and anticipation are drivers of the game sales, we would expect these rating institutions to play important roles in forming consumer prior beliefs about the game and therefore their purchases. But we also have some evidence from other industries that would suggest scores would independently cause purchases to rise, independent of the unobserved factors that cause expert opinion and purchases to be highly correlated. Reinstein and Snyder (2005) used exogenous variation in Siskel and Ebert movie ratings due to disruptions in their pair's reviewing to determine a causal effect on movie demand. More recently, Hilger Rafert and Villas-Boas (2010) found that randomly assigned expert scores on bottles of wine in a retail grocery store caused an increase in sales for the higher rated, but less expensive, wines.
While these studies do not confirm that there are exogenous forces in video game ratings that drive consumer purchases, they are suggestive.
We begin by estimating a standard multivariate regression model of the incidence of various crimes as functions of, among other controls, the prevalence of non-violent and violent video games. Our outcome variables of interest, C t , are the total number of reported criminal incidents in week t as well as the number of such incidents that are classified as violent. While one might interpret any criminal incident as reflecting some level of aggression, we interpret violent crimes as reflecting more aggression. While the dataset we use documents criminal offenses on a daily basis, since the video game sales data are available only on a weekly basis, we aggregate crimes into weekly measures to focus on same-week exposure. Accordingly, we employ a simple least squares estimator so as to more easily instrument for video game exposure.
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Our main explanatory variables are aggregated current and lagged values of weekly sales volumes for both non-violent and violent video games. Video games appear to depreciate quickly with use. This may be because new games are played intensively for a few weeks after purchase and are not replaced with a new game until after some diminishing returns have been reached, or it may suggest that firms typically stagger the release dates of games. We measure the cumulative effect of games with the sales volume of the current week's sales, along with the various lags of previous weeks' sales, so as to capture the effect of higher volume of gameplay with an unknown time lag to trigger crime.
Our benchmark specification is:
where L  is the lag operator of length . The number of crime incidents depends on the exposure to violent video games and non-violent games . The sum over  of can be interpreted as the cumulative percentage increase over the  weeks in criminal incidents for each percent increase in violent video games sold in week t while the similar sum for can be similarly interpreted for non-violent video games. The trend and month dummies attempt to account for secular increases and seasonality in video game purchases. The identification of the parameters is based on the time-series variation in the style of violence in the video games. Again, we instrument for both types of games using average quality ratings of the games on the market that week.
The measured effect from this specification can represent a confluence of multiple effects. It is possible for there to be a positive behavioral effect, as found in the laboratory, and a negative voluntary incapacitation effect. This specification will typically only measure the net effect. However, it may be possible to disentangle the behavioral effects from the incapacitation effect from the estimated cumulative effects from non-violent and violent games. Both should incorporate incapacitation effects but only the former will include a behavioral effect toward aggression. The difference between the two provides an estimate of a pure aggression effect.
Besides the benchmark specification we employ two additional specifications as robustness checks. These specifications identify specific segments of the population and locations where we expect a differential a gaming-to-violence link, e.g. crimes committed by teens and young adults and those committed at high school and college campuses. For each crime incident, NIRBS provides information on the age of the offender and on the location of the incident. In the first robustness check, we select a sun-sample of offenders aged between 15 and 30 years and compare these results to the results obtained from a sub-sample of offenders who are 35 to 50 years old. In our second check, we extend our estimation procedure to compare the effects on the number of incidents reported on school campuses to the number committed at other locations.
B. Video Game Sales Data
Our Our measure of violent videogame content stems from the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB). 9 This non-profit body independently assigns a technical rating (E, E10, T, M, and A) which defines the audience the game is appropriate for where E classifies games for everybody, E10 for everyone aged 10 and up, T for teens, M games for a mature audience, and A for adult content. In addition, ESRB provides detailed description of the content in each game on which the rating was made, including the style of violence, e. g. language, violence, or adult themes. For all of the 1,091 titles in our sample we collected the appropriate ESRBrating and all content descriptors. Based on this content information we identify 762 nonviolent and 329 violent games, of which 105 titles are described as intensely violent. Almost all violent games are rated T or M. All intensely violent games are rated M. Since most of the policy concern stems from these intensely violent games, these are the games we concentrate on. 10 Merging both data sources together we can construct measures of the aggregate unit sales of non-violent and intensely violent video games for each week. The weekly sales are pictured in Figure 3 for all games and for intensely violent games. Overall, the two graphs follow a similar pattern with a peak around the Christmas gift purchasing period. In the mid of 2008, however, the intense violent games seem to account for almost all sales of the violent games.
As argued above the prevalence of video games in a week is not randomly distributed over the sample and therefore may be endogenous. For instance, if changing economic conditions that caused a rise in unemployment, and in turn crime rates, may also have caused leisure activities like video games to rise, then we might observe positive correlations between video game play and crime that is driven purely by these changing economic factors (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001; Gould, Weinberg and Mustard 2002) . We address the potential endogeneity of video games with instrumental variables using expert review of each title as an instrument for purchases.
Our expert review data comes from the GameSpot website. 11 GameSpot provides news, reviews, previews, downloads and other information for video games. Launched in May 1996 GameSpot's main page has links to the latest news, reviews, previews and portals for all current platforms. It also includes a list of the most popular games on the site and a search engine for users to track down games of interest. The GameSpot staff reviewed all but a handful of the games in our sample and rated the quality of the titles on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the best possible rank. These so-called GameSpot-scores assigned to each game are intended to provide an at-a-glance sense of the overall quality of the game. The overall rating is based on evaluations of graphics, sound, gameplay, replay value and reviewer's tilt.
A possible issue with this measure is that GameSpot changed the rating system in mid of 2007
to employ guidelines and a philosophy focusing more on a prospective customer rather than a hardcore-fan that the reviewers had focused on before. Nevertheless, the five mentioned aspects are essential parts of a game that are still reviewed in detail by a GameSpot reviewer but will not get an aspect-specific rating score anymore. We do not consider this change in the GameSpot focus to noticeably affect the overall GameSpot-score.
We expect the quality rating of the games to be positively correlated with their sales as better-rated games usually are more highly demanded. It is possible that some games have the opposite relationship if they are based on a popular tie-in from a movie, e. g. Harry Potter, or sequels, e. g. the Final Fantasy series. Developers know that these games will sell well due to their popular tie-in which may lower the returns to investment in game quality. However, in Crimes follow a seasonal pattern. Figure 4 indicates a consistent pattern of gradual increases in both violent and non-violent crimes from winter to summer. Our method was developed to account for seasonality in both of our main variables of interest crime and games. Much of the seasonality in crimes is believed to be due to weather while seasonality in games is likely due to holiday gift giving (Lefgren, Jacobs and Moretti 2007). Failure to address this will likely lead to spurious correlations. As indicated above, we accommodate this in two ways. First, month dummy variables should capture much of the seasonality.
Second, using Game Spot scores as IVs should isolate the variation in game sales due to game quality.
Our final sample includes 208 weekly observations on video games sales and crimes from early 2005 through 2008. However, eight observations are excluded from final regressions because of the use of lagged video game sales. Table 3 reports basic descriptive statistics for our sample. Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 reports estimates of specifications for various lags of the effect video games sales on all crimes. Video games are separated between those that the ESRB rated as "intensely violent" and those that are not.
IV. Results

A. Basic Results
Our basic regression results are presented in
Recall that the lesser rating of merely "violent" does not warrant an ESRB rating of "M."
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Control variables include month dummies to capture seasonality and a time trend to capture any secular trend. The columns from left to right add more lags of video games to the specification so as to measure possible inter-temporal effects of game purchases in one week affecting crime in subsequent weeks through continued play. Finally, each regression employs a 2SLS estimator with the same set of current and eight lags of Game Spot scores averaged over intensely violent games and over games that are not intensely violent. Since the specifications are over-identified, we test for possible endogeneity of the instrument set. As expected, in all cases, we fail to reject the exogeneity of Game Spot scores with respect to the level of crime.
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The estimated effect of video games sales in any single week is small. Most individual coefficient estimates are negative but few are significantly different from zero. It appears that lags of up to five weeks of video game sales may be associated with current crime. It is not clear from this table whether violent games have a different effect from those that are not violent. For ease of comparison, we report the sum of the coefficients for various lags for both in the top panel of Table 6 to calculate the cumulative effect of a change in video games over time. Here it becomes clearer that video games are estimated to have an overall negative effect on crime for specifications that include from two to six lags. That is, both violent and non-violent games are associated with reductions in crimes. However, the effect is small.
Since our specification is double log, these estimates can be interpreted as elasticities with 12 Unreported regressions comparing games that are either "intensely violent" or "violent" versus all other games generally yield much less precisely estimated parameters. 13 Estimates assuming that game sales are exogenously determined typically generated smaller (in absolute value terms) and much less precisely estimated coefficients.
values of up to -0.025 for non-violent games and -0.010 for violent games. These estimates suggest that, over all the mechanisms through which videogame play can affect crime, the net effect is to reduce crime.
As mentioned above, these estimates may also allow us to make some inferences that distinguish between potential mechanisms. While both violent and non-violent games are hypothesized to have incapacitation effects, only violent games are hypothesized to alter behaviors. Indeed, the top panel of Table 6 indicates that the difference in effects between violent and non-violent games is for violent games to reduce crime by a smaller amount and that this difference is statistically significant for specifications that include between one and five lags. Moreover, it is possible that the incapacitation effect for violent games is greater than for non-violent games, though we cannot test this hypothesis. If so, the difference of these estimates may represent a downwardly biased estimate of a behavioral effect. This provides some support for the laboratory findings of a reinforcing behavioral effect that partially counterbalances the incapacitation effect. Table 5 repeats these specifications where the dependent variable is now the log of violent crimes. By doing so, we focus on criminal acts that clearly entail an element of aggression. Again, we include various lags for the effects of video games and, again, more individual estimates are negative than positive but few are significantly different from zero.
The bottom panel of The test for a difference in the effects for violent and non-violent games may be more informative. There are no known previously hypothesized mechanisms through which nonviolent games would affect violent crimes. We propose that the appropriate test for violent video games affecting violent behavior is the difference in these effects by game type. In this case, the marginal effect of violent video games, relative to non-violent games, is to increase violent crimes. Decomposing the two effects suggests that a one hundred percent increase in violent video game sales implies an incapacitation effect reducing violent crime by as much as 2.6% and an aggression effect increasing violent crimes by as much as 1.5%.
B. Age of Offender Results
A potential robustness check is to examine the effects of video games on criminal offenders by age of offender. While the age profile of video game players is increasing, video games are still primarily played by children, teens and younger adults. For most offenses, the NIBRS data records information on the age of the offenders for an incident. We separately examine the effects of video game sales on offenders aged 15-30, the prime video game playing population, versus those 35-50, a population for which video game play is not as popular. If our basic results were spurious and did not reflect any direct link between video game play and criminal acts, we would have no reason to expect a differential effect by age group. In contrast, under our hypotheses, we would expect larger effects for the younger group. Table 7 reports cumulative estimates for both these younger and older groups. The specifications are otherwise identical to those reported in Table 4 . However, rather than report the individual estimates as in Tables 4 and 5 , we report the estimated sums over all lags as in Table 6 . As before, specifications with lags from between two and five achieve some level of statistical significance for both the young and the old. The estimated effects of both violent and non-violent video games are both negative, as before. And, as before, violent video games decrease crime by less than do non-violent video games. That is, there are few, if any, qualitative differences across the two groups. Table 8 reports cumulative estimates where the dependent variable is violent crimes, for both these younger and older groups. The specifications are otherwise identical to those reported in Table 5 and again we report the estimated sum of effects over all lags as in Table   6 . Now, there are noticeable differences across the two groups. None of the estimates for the older group approach traditional levels of statistical significance. In contrast, the estimates for the younger group are generally larger (in absolute value) and many are statistically significant. In addition, the differences in estimates between violent and nonviolent games are often statistically significant. We again find that, for the younger group, non-violent games, as well as violent games, reduce the number of violent crimes. In these specifications, the measured by the difference between the coefficients in the two rows which is about 0.06.
Thus, this is evidence that the behavioral effect of violent video games on violent behavior is found only within the younger population that tends to play video games more intensively.
C. On Campus Results
Another potential robustness check is to distinguish between crimes committed at schools and colleges and those committed elsewhere. Schools and colleges tend to aggregate people who are of video game playing age. The NIBRS data record the location of each incident as a categorical variable where one possible choice out of eleven is "school or college campus." One advantage of this variable over the age of offender variable is that it is recorded for all incidents while the age of offender can be missing if no one witnessed the incident in progress. One disadvantage is that crimes committed at schools and colleges need not be committed by a member of the younger video game playing demographic, though most are.
Perhaps a bigger problem is that many of the younger video game playing population commit crimes away from schools. Finally, since such a small number of crimes are committed on campus, we may lose statistical power for that sub-sample while the off-campus sub-sample will be quite similar to the overall sample. Table 9 reports cumulative estimates for both crimes committed on campuses and those committed off-campus. The specifications are otherwise identical to those reported in Table 4 but we report the estimated cumulative effect over all lags as in Table 6 . As before, specifications with lags from between two and five achieve some level of statistical significance for both the young and the old. The pattern of estimated effects for both violent and non-violent video games is similar to before except that they are much larger for the oncampus sample than off-campus sample. In the lower panel, the estimates are qualitatively similar to the base results in Table 6 . However, the upper panel estimates are about five times larger. Other than the difference in magnitudes, the pattern of effects on-campus is unchanged. There is still a negative effect for non-violent video games in columns 2-5 that we interpret as an incapacitation effect. The estimated effect for violent video games is statistically significantly smaller (in absolute value) and we interpret the difference as a possible estimate of a behavioral effect of violent video games on crime for this sub-sample. Table 10 reports cumulative estimates where the dependent variable is the number of violent crimes, for both crimes on and off campus. The specifications are otherwise identical to those reported in Table 2 and again we report the estimated sum of effects over all lags as in Table 6 . In this case, fewer effects are estimated to be significantly different from zero.
However, the pattern is similar to those for all crimes in table 9. The magnitudes are about five times larger for the on-campus sub-sample relative to the off-campus sub-sample. As expected, the off-campus results are more similar our basic results reported in the bottom panel of Table 6 .
V. Conclusion
Content regulation of the video game industry is usually predicated on the notion that the industry has large and negative social costs through games' effect on aggression. Many researchers have argued that these games may also have caused extreme violence, such as school shootings, because laboratory evidence has found an abundance of evidence linking gameplay to aggression. Yet few studies before this one had examined the impact of these games on crime, with the exception of Ward (2011) and Dahl and Dellavegna (2009) .
Consistent with these studies, we find that the social costs of violent video games may be considerably lower, or even non-existent, once one incorporates the time use effect into analysis.
These analyses are suggestive of the hypothesis that violent video games, like all video games, paradoxically may reduce violence while increasing the aggressiveness of individuals by simply shifting these individuals out of alternative activities where crime is more likely to occur. Insofar as our findings suggest that the operating mechanism by which violent gameplay causes crime to fall is the gameplay itself, and not the violence, then regulations should be carefully designed so as to avoid inadvertently reducing the time intensity, or the appeal, of video games.
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